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n the early 1980s, when Chile ﬁrst priva-
tized its social security system, few
observers could have predicted that its
action would precipitate the worldwide
interest in privatization that prevails today.
In large part, the current interest grows out
of a belief that privatizing social security
can enhance national economic growth
and lead to a higher standard of living for
workers and retirees.  Indeed, many analysts
have attributed Chile’s current economic
success to social security privatization.
Whether that is actually the case will no
doubt be a subject for study by economic
historians for years to come.  In the mean-
time, a question that many researchers and
others are asking is “Will privatization yield
the expected beneﬁts in the United States?”
Among the researchers who have studied
this question are Seidman (1986) and Feldstein
(1995), who use partial equilibrium frameworks,
and Arrau (1990), Arrau and Schmidt-Hebel
(1993), Raffelhuschen (1993), and Huang,
Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1997), who use
general equilibrium frameworks.
This article uses simulations in a stylized
model—the Auerbach-Kotlikoff Dynamic
Life Cycle model—to explore some possible
economic outcomes of privatizing Social
Security in the United States: ﬁrst, the poten-
tial impact on the macro economy; second,
how different generations may be affected (in
particular, whether privatization will enhance
or undermine intragenerational equity); and,
third, some efﬁciency gains that might arise
from privatization.
The parameters in this model (hereinafter
referred to as the A-K model) closely parallel
those of U.S. economic conditions and ﬁscal
policies.  In addition, the model has more
detailed equilibrium frameworks than those
in the other models cited above.  Previously
used in a number of simulation studies (see
Kotlikoff, 1996 and 1998, and Kotlikoff et al.,
1997 and 1998), the A-K model has recently
been enhanced to include intragenerational
heterogeneity, kinked budget constraints, and
a more realistic formulation of income taxation. 
All the variations of the A-K model
comprise three basic elements: (1) workers
are required to contribute to private retirement
accounts, (2) social security beneﬁts are awarded
to those who are workers and retirees  during
the transition in accordance with the  bene-
ﬁts they have accrued before the transition,
and (3) these transitional beneﬁts are  paid
for by means of a wage tax, an income tax,
a consumption tax, or a combination of
income taxes and deﬁcit ﬁnancing.  Simu-
lations in the A-K model indicate that the
long-run effects on the macro economy
differ substantially from the short-run effects,
depending on how the transition is ﬁnanced.
Because consumption-tax ﬁnancing produces
much more rapid economic gains than either
wage- or income-tax ﬁnancing (see Kotlikoff
et al., 1997 and 1998), I discuss only the
consumption-tax simulation in this article.
MACROECONOMIC CONCERNS
Privatization is often espoused as a
means to stimulate long-run economic
growth.  If this is to happen, however, the
supplies of labor and capital must increase.
One way to stimulate increases in labor
and capital is to reduce the effective tax
rate on wages (by eliminating the Social
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Security tax).  When workers collect a
larger portion of their earnings, they have
more incentive to work, and when they
work more, their increased earnings allow
them to save more, so that ultimately labor
supply, national income, saving, and capital
formation all increase.  
The above analysis ignores the transi-
tion costs of privatization, however.  The
obligations to retirees and older workers
must be ﬁnanced.  Replacing a Social Secu-
rity tax with a transition tax on wages will
increase labor supply only to the extent
that the overall tax burden declines.  Kot-
likoff et al. (1997 and 1998) have shown
that using a consumption tax to ﬁnance
the transition provides the least distortion
and hence raises labor supply the most. 
INTRAGENERATIONAL EQUITY
Will privatization enhance or undermine
generational equity?  The U.S. Social Security
System, like systems in many other countries,
aims at intragenerational equity by providing
beneﬁts on a progressive scale.  That is, it
relates beneﬁts to past earnings.  But because
the poor tend to die at earlier ages than the
rich, and therefore may not be around to col-
lect their beneﬁts as long as those who are
better off ﬁnancially, the system is actually
less progressive than is commonly believed.
While privatizing the U.S. system would
eliminate its progressive beneﬁts schedule at
the margin, it might entail little or no annuiti-
zation of individual account balances; thus,
under the system in the A-K model, heirs of
persons who die young could inherit much
or all of the decedents’ account balances.  The
actual outcome would depend on the new
system’s withdrawal and bequest rules, but
reversing the annuitization of the elderly’s
resources could have important implications
for intragenerational equity over time.
EFFECTS ON EFFICIENCY GAINS
The recent announcement by Social
Security actuaries that, over the previous
20 years, they had made a mistake amounting
to almost $1 billion in calculating retirees’
beneﬁts emphasizes the complexities of
our present Social Security System, which
can be daunting to the experts, let alone
the average worker.  It is little wonder  that
most workers have a very difﬁcult time
determining, at the margin, just how much
return they will receive on their marginal
Social Security contributions.  As a result,
most may tend to treat the entire 15.3 per-
cent Social Security payroll tax as an effective
marginal tax on their labor supply.  And since
most  workers who contribute to Social Secu-
rity at the margin face additional federal  as
well as state labor tax rates totaling roughly
25 percent, the system in effect raises their
total marginal tax rates by approximately  60
percent.  The efﬁciency cost of distortionary
taxation rises with the square of the effec-
tive tax rate; therefore, adding a 15 percent
payroll tax to a 25 percent effective labor
income tax increases the distortion of
worker labor supply by roughly 150 percent.
In contrast, privatizing Social Security
would eliminate the labor-supply distortion
associated with the payroll tax.  Few solu-
tions are as simple as they seem, however;
the method used to ﬁnance accrued Social
Security beneﬁts during the transition will
introduce a new and different set of distor-
tions.  Just how signiﬁcant the distortion
turns out to be will depend on the method
chosen.  Kotlikoff et al. (1997 and 1998)
show that consumption-tax ﬁnancing would
yield larger efﬁciency gains than other pro-
posed methods because this tax is in effect
a one-time wealth tax—that is, when indi-
viduals spend a portion of their wealth,
they must pay a tax.
THE A-K MODEL
Having reviewed some of the concerns
involved in moving to privatization, we can
now examine some details of the A-K model
before moving on to the simulation outcomes.
There are three economic sectors in the model:
government, ﬁrms, and households, and the
time paths of all economic variables in the
model’s economy are calculated over a 150-
year period.  The two-part government
sector consists of a treasury that collects
funds from the private sector to pay for
government operations and an unfunded,FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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“pay-as-you-go” social security system that
levies payroll taxes and distributes beneﬁt
payments.  Since there is no money in the
model, there is no monetary policy.  Perfectly
competitive ﬁrms use a Cobb-Douglas
production function, hiring labor and capital
to maximize proﬁts. 
Generations and Income Classes
There are 55 overlapping generations
with a work-life span of 55 years each (from
age 20 to age 75). The population growth
rate in the model is a constant 1 percent—
that is, each generation is 1 percent larger
than the previous one—and within each
generation are 12 different earnings classes,
according to a pattern established by Fullerton
and Rogers (1993).  The income groupings
are by deciles, with the bottom and top
deciles subdivided into two classes each:
Class 1 represents the lowest 2 percent and
Class 2 the remaining 8 percent of the
bottom decile, while Class 12 represents the
top 2 percent and Class 11 the 8 percent
immediately below it. 
The wages for all income classes grow at
the same rates, and they are set to reproduce
the relative differences between classes esti-
mated by Fullerton and Rogers (1993).  In
this simulation of the A-K model, the lowest
level of earnings, in Class 1, is $3.50 per
hour for a worker at age 20.  The starting
wage level for the median income class is
approximately $13 per hour, and for the top
2 percent it is $36 an hour.  As the model’s
agents grow older, they receive a realistic
series of wage increases amounting to 45
percent over the 55-year cycle and peaking at
year 45 (age 65).  Annual income from labor
ranges from $10,000 to $110,000.  The indi-
vidual’s age-wage proﬁle is separate from the
general level of wages, the time path of
which is determined in solving the model.
Factors Affecting Spending and Saving
Fiscal policies affect households by
altering the after-tax value of their wages,
rates of return, and (in the case of a
consumption tax) prices of goods and ser-
vices.  Since all the classes in the model
experience the same longitudinal earnings
growth and all agents are assumed to have
the same preferences, differences in their
behavior arise solely from differences in
their economic opportunities, which vary
with their class.  This heterogeneity
enables us to study the effects of privatiza-
tion on the intragenerational distribution
of economic resources and welfare.
Individual agents or households in the
model base their decisions concerning
how much to work and how much to save
on their after-tax wages and the after-tax
rates of return on their labor and their sav-
ings—both in the present and in the future.
They also decide when to retire.  The time-
separable CES consumption and leisure
preferences that govern these decisions are
based on evidence from actual labor
supply and saving behavior.  
Social Security Beneﬁts
Replacement rates, the ratio of retire-
ment beneﬁts to pre-retirement earnings,
are calculated by the U.S. Social Security
System’s beneﬁt calculation formula.
Applying this formula, we obtained
lifetime income replacement rates ranging
from 50 percent for the poorest income
class to 20 percent for the richest.  To
allow the model to take survivor beneﬁts
into account and reproduce the current
system’s Old-Age and Survivor’s Insurance
(OASI) payroll tax rate of 10 percent, 
the replacement rates were scaled up by 
60 percent.  
This version of the A-K model also
incorporates the 1995 ceiling of $61,200
on taxable payroll earnings, making the
maximum payroll tax base smaller than
the maximum labor income.  As a result,
decisions by agents in the classes with the
highest lifetime earnings regarding how
much and/or how long to work are not
distorted by consideration of payroll taxes,
because the marginal payroll tax for such
persons is zero.  
Medicare and Disability Insurance 
A ﬂat (non earnings-related) beneﬁt
for agents over age 65 in our modelFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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approximates current Medicare and Social
Security disability insurance.  In the U.S.
system, these beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by an
additional payroll tax of 4.7 percent and
are indexed to the economy’s real wage.
Since this tax is not subject to a ceiling, it
distorts the labor-supply decisions of all
workers.  In the simulations, these beneﬁts
are unchanged, so that the total payroll tax
in the initial state of our model is 14.7 per-
cent, equivalent to the U.S. payroll tax net
of trust-fund contributions, divided by the
U.S. payroll tax base.
Government Consumption   
In the United States, government func-
tions are ﬁnanced by a progressive income
tax.  The model uses a calibrated progres-
sive income tax function to produce an
overall average rate of 19.1 percent and an
overall average marginal rate of 26.1
percent. For the class with the highest life-
time earnings, the top marginal rate is 45
percent, and the average rate is 39.7.  For
median earners, the top marginal rate is
approximately 26.3 percent, and the
average rate is 23.2.   
MODELING PRIVATIZATION
Privatizing Social Security generally
involves three measures: (1) requiring workers
to contribute to private retirement accounts,
(2) providing retirees and current workers
Social Security beneﬁts equal to only those
beneﬁts they have accrued at the time pri-
vatization is implemented, and (3) ﬁnancing
these accrued beneﬁts.  In the A-K model,
privatization requires simply eliminating
the Social Security payroll tax.  Because agents
are not liquidity constrained, they cannot
be forced to save.  If agents are required to
place a higher-than-desired percentage of
their income in probate retirement accounts,
they will offset this forced saving by borrowing
against these accounts.1 In the model, the
phasing out of Social Security beneﬁts begins
10 years after privatization occurs.  That
way, current retirees (those 65 to 74 years
old when the reform is initiated) receive
the same beneﬁts they would have received
in the absence of privatization.  Starting in
the 11th year of the reform, Social Security
beneﬁts are phased out by 2.2 percent (of
the baseline beneﬁts) per year for 45 years.
Thus, the transition to a fully privatized system
takes an entire model lifetime (55 years).
During the transition period, the accrued
Social Security beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by a
proportional consumption tax.  This tax
starts at 9 percent and declines to zero by
the end of the transition period.  Privatizing
Social Security also alters the income-tax
base.  Since, in the simulations, a constant
level of government purchases per effective
worker is maintained, the progressive
income-tax rates are adjusted to account
for privatization-induced changes over
time in the income-tax base.  The formula
for the average progressive income tax
rate, t, is t  = a  + b  (B  /2), where B  is the
income tax base.  In lowering a, holding b
ﬁxed, we lower the income tax rates facing
all agents, but by a greater percentage for
agents with lower income s.  
Table 1
Macroeconomic Effects of Privatization
(percentage change relative to the baseline)
Uncompensated Welfare
Year of Privatization
5 10 25 150
Capital stock 3.7 7.7 17.0 36.7
Labor supply 2.3 2.6 2.6 3.7
Output 2.7 3.3 6.1 11.2
Real wages 0.3 1.4 3.4 7.1
Real interest rate –1.0 –4.0 –9.4 –18.7
Compensated Welfare
Year of Privatization
5 10 25 150
Capital stock 1.2 2.5 5.5 8.5
Labor supply 1.8 1.7 2.8 5.3
Output 1.7 1.9 3.5 6.1
Real wages –0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4
Real interest rate 0.4 –0.6 –1.9 –2.2FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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FINDINGS
This section examines the macroeconomic
and welfare effects of privatizing Social Security,
ﬁnancing the transition by means of consump-
tion taxation.  Simulations of the model indicate
that such a reform would have both short-term
and long-term macroeconomic beneﬁts—the
capital stock (K), labor supply (L), output (Y),
and real wages (w) would all be above their
baseline levels (the levels in the absence of pri-
vatization), while the real interest rate (r) would
fall.  These results are illustrated in the top half
of Table 1 and Figure 1.
The long-run macroeconomic gains are
striking:  The capital stock increases by 36.7
percent relative to the baseline, aggregate
labor supply increases by 3.7 percent, output
increases by 11.2 percent, and real wages
increase by 7.1 percent.  In addition, the real
interest rate falls by 18.7 percent.  While these
long-run gains are impressive, they do not
occur instantaneously.  The transition’s half-
life is roughly 25 years.  The lengthiness of
this transition is partly a result of the gradual
reduction in Social Security beneﬁts and the
consequent need to ﬁnance these beneﬁts.
The use of a consumption tax to ﬁnance these
beneﬁts provides for the fastest transition in
terms of macroeconomic beneﬁts, since such
a tax produces redistribution from retirees to
workers.  Because retirees have higher propen-
sities  to consume than do workers, this
redistribution results in a decline in aggregate
consumption and a rise in saving.  In addition,
the consumption tax temporarily raises the
price of consumption, providing all agents with
an incentive to substitute saving for consump-
tion.  Nevertheless, these sharp rises in saving
rates change the magnitude of the capital
stock very gradually.2
The success of any privatization effort
depends not only on the aggregate beneﬁts
to the economy but the effect on the well-
being of the individuals in the economy.  As
the top portions of Table 2 and Figure 2
illustrate, in the model privatization provides
welfare gains across all income classes in the
long run.  Moreover, the gains are inversely
proportional to the income class.  Thus, the
lifetime utility of the poorest 2 percent (Class
1) of agents rises by 9.0  percent in the long
run, while that of the wealthiest 2 percent
(Class 12) of agents rises by only 5.4 percent.
This is a noteworthy outcome in light of the
fact that privatizing Social Security entails
abandoning what is considered to be a highly
progressive Social Security beneﬁts schedule. 
There are two reasons that privatization
is, in the long run, progressive.  First, the
intercept adjustment (a) of income tax rates
in response to the tax-base increase favors
lower-income agents over higher-income agents.
Second, the ceiling on taxable earnings under
the current Social Security System means
that the implicit tax associated with being
forced to contribute to a pay-as-you-go social
security system is a larger factor for low
earners, relative to their lifetime resources.
The increases in lifetime utility in the
long run come at the cost of non-trivial
welfare losses for the older agents alive at
2 See Auerbach and Kotlikoff







































Macroeconomic Effects of Privatization
r
r
0              20              40              60              80            100            120             140FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
36
3 The use of lump-sum nature of
the taxes and transfers ensures
that they do not distort the
labor supply decisions of agents
in the model.  If lump-sum
taxes and transfers are not
available the efﬁciency gains
and macroeconomic beneﬁts
discussed below would be
reduced.
4 For an analysis of these issues
see Kotlikoff et al. (1998). 
MARCH/APRIL  1998
the time of the transition.  The burden is
greatest for those who are elderly at the time
of the transition period, since they tend to
have higher consumption levels and their
opportunities for wage increases are
diminishing or nonexistent.  For example,
those in the 5th percentile (Class 6) who
were born 54 years prior to the start of the
transition (those age 74 when privatization
occurs) experience a 3.8 percent drop in
their remaining lifetime utility.  Furthermore,
the decline in welfare experienced by the
oldest cohorts falls most heavily on those in
the lowest income classes. 
All generations entering the workforce
after the start of the transition experience net
welfare gains resulting from privatization.  In
fact, most income classes of agents who are in
their early work years when the transition
occurs experience small positive welfare bene-
ﬁts.  The only exception is the wealthiest 2
percent of agents (Class 12), whose remaining
lifetime utility falls by 0.1 percent. 
Efﬁciency Gains
The result that privatization is welfare-
enhancing in the long run but welfare-
decreasing in the short run raises an important
question: Can a privatized U.S. Social Secu-
rity  System be Pareto improving?  That is,
can the unborn winners compensate the
existing losers, leaving no agent in any
generation worse off and at least some of
them better off?  To accomplish this result,
the model contains a Lump Sum Redistrib-
ution Authority (LSRA)—a hypothetical
government agency that can redistribute
resources among the different members of
current and future generations by means of
lump-sum taxes and transfers.3
The LSRA ensures that (1) all agents
who are alive at the start of the transition
experience the identical level of utility during
the transition that they would have experi-
enced in the absence of privatization (deviation
from the baseline is zero); and, (2) all agents
born at the time of the reform and thereafter
experience an identical percentage increase
in their utility.  In the latter case, the utility
increase is measured by the percentage change
in lifetime consumption and leisure patterns
that would have been needed in the old steady
state to generate the level of utility enjoyed
as a result of the privatization.  
The simulation results indicate that the
efﬁciency gains can be substantial.  As shown
in the bottom portions of Table 2 and Figure 2,
these gains are 1.7 percent.  However, there
is no guarantee that reducing the labor supply
distortions through privatizing Social Secu-
rity  will make the economy more efﬁcient.
Such a result depends on how privatization
is ﬁnanced and the degree to which Social
Security beneﬁts are perceived to be linked
to Social Security payroll taxes.4
A comparison between the results from
the uncompensated and the compensated
welfare plans indicates that in the long run
generations have a higher lifetime utility under
the former.  Nevertheless, it is important
to note that most of the long-run welfare
gains to future generations in the uncom-
pensated case come at the expense of the
generations of persons who are alive at the
time of the transition.
As the tables and ﬁgures make clear, the
need to compensate initial generations reduces
the long-run performance of the economy
relative to the uncompensated case.  For
Table 2
Remaining Lifetime Utility for Selected 
Income Classes and Cohorts
(percentage change relative to the baseline)
Uncompensated Welfare
Year of Birth
Income Class –54 –25 –10 0 10 25 150
Class 1 –4.5 –1.6 1.0 2.6 3.7 6.0 9.0
Class 3 –4.0 –1.5 1.2 2.6 3.6 5.7 8.4
Class 6 –3.8 –1.3 1.3 2.6 3.7 5.6 8.1
Class 9 –3.7 –1.1 1.4 2.7 3.7 5.5 7.9
Class 12 –3.5 –1.3 –0.1 0.8 1.7 3.4 5.4
Compensated Welfare
Year of Birth
Income Class –54 –25 –10 0 10 25 150
All income 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
classesFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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example, the long-run level of economic
output is 6.1 percent above the baseline when
welfare is compensated; this ﬁgure rises to
11.2 percent when welfare is uncompensated.
The capital stock and real wages are similarly
lower in the compensated case, and the real
interest rate is higher.
CONCLUSION
The simulation results indicate 
that privatization of the Social Security
System and ﬁnancing the transition with a
consumption tax can have positive effects
on both the performance of the economy
and the welfare of individuals in the
economy.  The long-run capital stock (per
person) rises by more than one-third, and
the level of output increases by more than
10 percent.  The welfare of future genera-
tions rises, with the added bonus that
those at the low end of the income distrib-
ution receive the highest welfare gains.
However, older workers at the start of the
transition experience signiﬁcant welfare
losses.  Thus, the extent to which privati-
zation results in efﬁciency gains depends
on the ability of future generations to com-
pensate current workers for the loss of
consumption as a result of ﬁnancing the
transition.
REFERENCES
Arrau, Patricio.  Social Security Reform: The Capital Accumulation and
Intergenerational Distribution Effect, The World Bank, 1990.
Arrau, Patricio, and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel. “Macroeconomic and
Intergenerational Welfare Effects of a Transition from Pay-As-You-Go to
Fully Funded Pensions,” Policy Research Department, Macroeconomics
and Growth Division, The World Bank, 1993.
Auerbach, Alan J., and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Dynamic Fiscal Policy,
Cambridge University Press, 1987
Feldstein, Martin, “Would Privatizing Social Security Raise Economic
Welfare?” mimeo, Harvard University, August 1995.
Fullerton, Don, and Diane Lim Rogers.  Who Bears the Lifetime Tax
Burden?  The Brookings Institution, 1993.
Huang, He, Selahattin Imrohoroglu, and Thomas J. Sargent. “Two
Computations to Fund Social Security,” Macroeconomic Dynamics
(1997:1), pp. 7-44.
Kotlikoff, Laurence J.  “Simulating the Privatization of Social Security in
General Equilibrium,” forthcoming in Privatizing Social Security, Martin
S. Feldstein, ed., University of Chicago Press, 1998.
_______.  “Privatizing of Social Security: How It Works and Why It
Matters,” in Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 10, James M. Poterba,
ed., MIT Press, 1996, pp.1-32.
_______, Kent Smetters, and Jan Walliser.  “Privatizing U.S. Social
Security—A Simulation Study,” forthcoming in Pension Systems:
From Crisis to Reform, Klaus Schmidt Hebbel, ed., The World Bank,
1998.
_______, _______, and _______. “The Economic Impact of
Privatizing Social Security,” paper presented at the 1997 Kiel Week
Conference  held at the Kiel Institute of World Economics, June 26-27,
1997.
Raffelh¨uschen, Bernd, “Funding Social Security through Pareto-Optimal
Conversion Policies,” Public Pension Economics, Bernhard Felderer,
ed., Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift fur National`konomie  (Suppl. 7,
1993), pp. 105-31. 
Seidman, Laurence S., “A Phase-Down of Social Security: The Transition



























–54      –34       –14           7          27        47         67         87        107        127       147
Remaining Lifetime Utility
(by income class)
–54       –34       –14          7           27         47          67         87         107        127       147
1
3
6
9
12